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ABSTRACT: The work hereof  intends to analyse some profiles of  the regular migration phenomenon 
in Italy, by examining the most recent and relevant regulatory interventions in the welfare sector, both 
at state and local level. In particular, we intend to demonstrate that at least three approaches regarding 
the reaction of  the legal system towards the access of  the “other” currently co-occur in Italy. To this 
end, the first to be analyzed will be some examples of  “exclusionary” operations will be analysed, 
which are based on the defense of  the national cultural identity and the promotion of  citizenship in its 
formal sense (C. Schmitt) – as they are found in several ordinances of  local Authorities which restrict 
access to social rights for foreigners, as well as in some Regional Laws on social welfare. In addition to 
these exclusionary operations, even a second relational model will be examined, which is inclusive and 
assimilative, and therefore, opposite to the previous one, while it finds its most clear expression in the 
Integration Agreement, which an immigrant seeking a residency permit needs to adhere to. Finally, 
we will focus on a “third way”, inspired by an integrative approach based on the concept of  permeable 
identity (J. Habermas), pursuant to which both they who welcome and who are welcomed are called upon 
to hold an attitude of  mutual listening and understanding, not aimed at the incorporation of  the weaker 
in the stronger, but rather, at the identification of  common areas of  dialogue that can lead to the best 
integration possible of  two new identities (as both have made contact with the “other”). In this context, 
this paper aims at enhancing the role of  the new public integration policies – especially at the local level 
– on sustainable development of  current pluralist societies. In this regard, the legal instruments which 
are most effective in terms of  developing an approach which is resilient and open-minded to communities 
that welcome regular immigrants, by facilitating the creation of  (institutionalized and spontaneous) 
moments of  dialogue and the sharing of  knowledge of  each other’s cultures.
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I. Introduction. The “other’s” entrance and the different 
reactions of  the host society
One of  the greatest risks arising from the current phenomenon of  massive 
migration flows in Italy is to justify the implementation of  only emergent public 
policies, essentially inspired by the parameters of  internal security1 and by the 
guarantee of  fundamental rights, primarily those to life and health.2 The urgency to 
help and protect is undeniable, but it would be profoundly short-sighted – from a 
long-term perspective – not to recognize as much relevance the public policy, whose 
aim is to ensure that there is a construction of  legal, social, and cultural bases for the 
effective integration of  those people who come to Italy, not necessarily just those 
who to escape temporarily from unsustainable living conditions, but to also lay the 
foundations of  a new path of  life. This is the perspective from which the following 
reflections arise, focusing on the legal condition of  the regular immigrant population, 
as a privileged viewpoint of  the current dynamics that characterise the relationship 
between the host community (or, better, legal system) and the one who is received. 
To simplify, there seem to be, essentially, two ways in which a community reacts to the 
entrance of  the “other” in its territory:  either an attitude of  exclusion, and defending 
social identity through the enhancement of  citizenship in its traditional sense3 or an 
inclusive type of  attitude, aimed at allowing, on the contrary, a full assimilation of  the 
immigrant within the community, in function of  a different notion of  citizenship, 
which we could call “dynamic”.4
The theoretical foundations of  the first approach can be found in the theories 
1 Gabriella Lazaridis, Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe (Ashgate Publishing, 2011); Franco 
Frattini, “Fenomeni migratori e sicurezza in Europa”, Gnosis 4 (2015): 22; Vincenzo Cerulli Irelli, “Politica 
dell’immigrazione e tutela dei migranti (una discplina positiva in corso di evoluzione), Nuove Autonomie 2/3 
(2013): 519. 
2 Daniel Thym, “Ambiguities of  Personhood, Citizenship, Migration and Fundamental Rights 
in EU Law”, in Constructing the Person. Rights, Roles, Identities in EU Law, ed. Loïc Azoulai, Ségolène 
Barbou des Places and Etienne Pataut (Oxford: Hart, 2016), 111; Maria Immordino, “Pubbliche 
amministrazioni e tutela dei diritti fondamentali degli immigrati”, Federalismi 19 (2014): 1; Marco 
Borraccetti, “La prima assistenza ai migranti in arrivo tra diritti fondamentali e zone franche”, Diritto, 
immigrazione e cittadinanza 2 (2014): 13; Franck Duvell, “Fundamental Rights of  Migrants in an 
Irregular Situation in the European Union”, in http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA_2011_
Migrants_in_an_irregular_situation_EN.pdf; Ryszard Cholewinski, “Human Rights of  Migrants: The Dawn 
of  a New Era?”, in http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/imbr_2010/6; Gianluca Bascherini, Immigrazione 
e diritti fondamentali. L’esperienza italiana tra storia costituzionale e prospettive europee (Napoli: Iovene, 2007). 
3 “Citizenship always meant the exclusion of  non-members”, Velt Bader, “Introduction”, in 
Citizenship and Exclusion, ed. Velt Bader (Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 2. For an in-depth analysis 
of  this concept see Mario Savino, Le libertà degli altri. La regolazione amministrativa dei flussi migratory 
(Milano: Giuffrè, 2012), 4-12. 
4 The debate on the notion of  citizenship has recorded several – and often completely opposed 
– positions. For a general overview see Margaret Coady, “Citizenship: inclusion and exclusion”, in 
Handbook of  Children and Youth Studies, ed. Johanna Wyn, Helen Cahill (Singapore: Springer, 2014), 1; 
Diego A. Arcarazo, “Civic Citizenship Reintroduced? The Long-Term Residence Directive as a Post-National 
Form of  Membership”, European Law Journal 21 (2015): 200; Francesco Vetrò, “Oltre la cittadinanza: 
stranieri e diritti inviolabili”, in Cittadinanza inclusiva e flussi migratori, ed. Franco Astone, Francesco 
Manganaro, Antonio Romano Tassone, Fabio Saitta (Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, 2009), 121; Mark 
Bell, “Civic Citizenship and Migrant Integration”, European Public Law 13, (2007): 311; Carlo Emanuele 
Gallo, “La pluralità delle cittadinanze e la cittadinanza amministrativa”, Diritto amministrativo (2002): 481; 
Giorgio Berti, “Cittadinanza, cittadinanze e diritti fondamentali”, Rivista di diritto costituzionale (1997): 
16; Yasemin N. Soysal, Limits of  Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: 
University of  Chicago Press, 1994). 
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of  Carl Schmitt, according to whom a nation is a community of  individuals who 
share some common features such as language, place of  origin, values, history and a 
legal system.5 Each nation/community, therefore, is deemed a profoundly cohesive 
reality but at the same time is closed in itself  and generally “hostile” to ‘the other’. 
The second approach, however, refers to the notion of  Habermas’ “constitutional 
patriotism”.6 He theorized a rationality that is common to all men, which is discursive 
and communicative and should bring everyone to agree upon a “common constitution”. 
Such harmony of  principles does not come to a universal dimension, as it can only 
be a reflection of  the idea of  man and a community of  the hosting nation. This 
is the most critical element of  a setting that – as open to the dialogue with the 
other – assumes that the latter (spontaneously) assimilates the values of  the hosting 
nation. Experience shows that it is not uncommon for some of  those principles that, 
according to Habermas, should be felt as common “by nature”, may conflict with some 
identity “dogmas” of  the immigrants: by way of  example, I can refer to the female 
genital mutilation (infibulation), that violates several fundamental rights recognized 
by any western legal system. This makes it substantially impossible to imagine a 
mutual understanding between the two opposing viewpoints the recognition of  
minority rights finds a specific limit.7
II. The exclusionary pushes and the “shy” responses of  the 
Italian Constitutional Court
Upon examination of  some of  the main Italian legal phenomena regarding the 
relationship between indigenous and immigrant communities – albeit antithetical – it 
appears that both the aforementioned approaches currently, (paradoxically) coexist 
in the Italian legal system.
A clear manifestation of  the exclusionary attitude has emerged in the necessity 
and urgency ordinances, by means of  which many mayors have made the access 
criteria more selective to the registry office for the regularly resident migrant 
population in Italy. Since 2008, due to the increasing tendency of  the migration flow 
and the increasing assignment of  powers to local administrators pursuant to the 
so-called Security Package, the so-defined “season of  ordinances” has begun: necessity 
and urgency resolutions aimed at – pursuant to public security reasons – making the 
access criteria more selective to the registry office, by introducing more stringent 
requirements than those provided by state law.8 The Constitutional Court intervened 
by means of  a Resolution, stating the illegitimacy of  the state provision which allowed 
mayors to give effect, through ordinances, to permanent long-term effects capable 
of  affecting fundamental rights and freedoms.9 But, the exclusionary attitude, at the 
5 Carl Schmitt, Le categorie del politico (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998). 
6 Jürgen Habermas, La costellazione postnazionale – Mercato globale, nazioni e democrazia (Milano: 
Feltrinelli, 2002), 50. 
7 On this subject see Susan M. Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Woman (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999). For a theory of  minority rights respectful of  fundamental rights and 
freedom see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxfrod University Press, 1995). 
8 Angela Musumeci, “Sicurezza, migranti e livelli di governo”, in Immigrazione e integrazione, dalla 
prospettiva globale alle realtà locali, I, ed. Francesco Rimoli (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2014), 461. 
Nazzarena Zorzella, “I nuovi poteri dei sindaci nel pacchetto sicurezza e la loro ricaduta sugli stranieri”, Diritto, 
immigrazione e cittadinanza 3/4 (2008): 57. 
9 Const. Court, 7 April 2011, n. 115. See also Pasquale Cerbo, “Principio di legalità e «nuove ed inedite» 
fattispecie di illecito create dai Sindaci”, Le Regioni 1/2 (2012): 215. 
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local level, cannot be considered fully exceeded yet. Given I am referring to the 
discretionary power given to the local administrations in deciding to enhance worsen 
the inspections on the sanitary conditions of  the houses declared habitual residence 
by the immigrant: any negative outcome of  the inspection may lead to the ban on 
registration at the registry office.10
Even more significant is the experience of  the most recent regional laws on 
access to social services for foreigners who are regularly resident in Italy.11 In this 
regard, there is the issue of  those welfare benefits which go beyond the fundamental 
rights, but are still recognized to all citizens demonstrating an ability to meet certain 
requirements. It’s clear that the pretty high degree of  recognition of  the right to 
receive such services also in the case of  (regular) immigrants is a primary indicator 
of  the relationship model existing between a legal system and the immigrants.12
Issues primarily concern legislative power. According to Article 117 of  the 
Italian Constitution, immigration falls within the area of  the exclusive State powers, 
while it seems to exclude any jurisdiction at the regional level. However, the Italian 
Constitutional Court has immediately clarified that only the area of  the entrance 
and the residency permit of  foreigners in Italy regard the State’s legislative power in 
its strict sense (public security),13 whereas, on the contrary, other areas (assistance, 
education, health, etc.) must be managed in close coordination between the State 
and the Regions.14 As opposed to what concerns health, social assistance is assigned 
to the exclusive regional competence. This might lead to the conclusion that all 
the profiles unrelated to security or health, but to social welfare, should be solely 
governed by Regional laws.
However, together with regional regulations aimed at extending access to 
welfare benefits to foreigners who regularly reside in Italy, irrespective of  the length 
of  their stay,15 in recent years, several regional laws have been published which – on 
10 For a general overview of  recent contradictory Italian local residence policies see Enrico Gargiulo, 
“Le politiche di residenza in Italia: inclusione ed esclusione nelle nuove cittadinanze locali”, in La 
governance dell’immigrazione. Diritti, politiche e competenze, ed. Emanuele Rossi, Francesco Biondi Dal 
Monte, Massimiliano Vrenna (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013), 135. 
11 On the so called residential citizenship, that is the connection between residence and enjoyment 
of  several social rights, regardless of  the formal nationality, see Rainer Bauböck, Transnational 
Citizenship: Membership and Rights in International Migration (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1994); Seyla 
Benhabib, The Rights of  Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 10; Andrea De Bonis and Marco Ferrero, “Dalla cittadinanza etno-nazionale alla cittadinanza di 
residenza”, Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza 2 (2004), 49. 
12 See Cecilia Corsi, “Servizi sociali agli immigrati”, in Cittadinanza inclusiva e flussi migratori, ed. 
Franco Astone, Francesco Manganaro, Antonio Romano Tassone, Fabio Saitta (Soveria Mannelli: 
Rubettino, 2009), 95. In the European context, is particularly significant the Long Term Residence 
Directive (2003/109/CE). As far as it concerns in this context, through the study of  several cases 
dealing with this directive, has been underlined that «rights are not considered as a prize for an 
already successful and completed integration», Arcarazo, “Civic Citizenship Reintroduced?”, 321. 
13 Const. Court, 18 January 2013, n. 2; Const. Court, 15 April 2010, n. 134; Cons. Court, 14 May 
2008, n. 131. 
14 Const. Court, 25 February 2011, n. 61; Const. Court, 7 March 2008, n. 50; Const. Court, 14 April 
2006, n. 156. For an interesting analysis of  this issue see Gianluca Bascherini, “Il riparto di competenze 
tra Stato e Regioni in materia di immigrazione al tempo del «pacchetto sicurezza». Osservazioni a margine delle 
sentt. nn. 269 e 299 del 2010”, Giurisprudenza Costituzionale 5 (2010): 3901. 
15 For instance, l.r. Emilia Romagna, 24 marzo 2014, n. 5; l.r. Abruzzo, 13 dicembre 2014, n. 46; l.r. 
Campania, 8 febbraio 2010, n. 6; l.r. Toscana, 9 giugno 2009, n. 29 (whereon see Paolo Passaglia, “La 
legge regionale toscana sull’immigrazione: verso la costruzione di una società plurale. Commento 
alla legge regionale n. 29/2009”, in La governance dell’immigrazione. Diritti, politiche e competenze, ed. 
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the basis of  economic reasons – have ruled in very restrictive terms.16
Also in this context, the Italian Constitutional Court has intervened on several 
occasions, stigmatising the use of  citizenship and long-term residence requirements 
as exclusion criteria.17 However, the protection afforded by the Court appears to be 
weak, since in its judgments, it does not call into question the legitimacy of  restrictive 
regional measures, but merely challenges its content under the sole profile of  
reasonableness. In particular, according to the Court – despite the status of  regular 
tax payer of  the regular immigrant, the regional provisions which discriminate against 
access to welfare benefits would be legitimate if  they were based on “not blatantly 
irrational” reasons.18
Such a submissive attitude of  the Court could, over time, prove to be fragile 
and lead to unreasonable disparities in the national territory in access to assistance 
services for the foreigner. To avoid such a scenario, the reference to the exclusive 
legislative power of  the State on the determination of  the basic level of  benefits 
relating to civil and social entitlements could help. Given the improbable justifiability 
of  restrictive legislation to regular immigrants – on the constitutional level – in the 
light of  their status as tax payers, even supporting the position of  those who assume 
their unconditional access to all social care services is intolerable, the legitimacy of  
the related limitations should be verified not only on the criterion of  reasonableness 
in Article 3 of  the Italian Constitution, but also on Article 117(2)(m). The exercise 
of  the exclusive legislative power of  the State in the field of  basic level of  benefits 
would thus, be able to ensure an adequate uniformity of  treatment throughout the 
national territory, while respecting the regional and local autonomy now recognized 
by the law, through the faculty to waive in melius the general national standards.19
III. The assimilative logic and the consequent risk of  confusion 
between law and morality
Coming to the second relational model that may be established between a 
legal system and the regular immigrant, i.e., the assimilative type, the Integration 
Agreement is an undoubtedly appropriate example. It represents a kind of  contract 
between the Italian State and the foreigner, through which the regular immigrant 
undertakes to acquire certain credits within a certain time, on pain of  revocation 
of  the residency permit.20 The acquisition of  the aforementioned credits takes 
Emanuele Rossi, Francesco Biondi Dal Monte, Massimiliano Vrenna (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013), 
437). 
16 For instance, l.r. Lombardia, 12 febbraio 2002,  n. 1; l.r. Friuli Venezia Giulia, 31 marzo 2006, n. 6; 
l.p. Trento, 24 luglio 2012, n. 15. 
17 See Const. Court, 4 July 2013, n. 172; Const. Court, 9 February 2011, n. 40; Const. Court, 2 
December 2005, n. 432. See also Guido Corso, Straniero, cittadino, uomo. Immigrazione ed immigrati nella 
giurisprudenza costituzionale, Nuove autonomie (2012): 390. 
18 Const. Court, 4 July 2013, n. 172; Const. Court, 2 December 2005, n. 432. For a comment 
see Marco Calabrò, Livelli essenziali delle prestazioni sociali e politiche pubbliche per l’integrazione, www.
giustamm.it (2015): 1; Matteo Gnes, Il diritto degli stranieri extracomunitari alla non irragionevole 
discriminazione in materia di agevolazioni sociali, Giurisprudenza costituzionale (2005): 4681. 
19 Cecilia Corsi, “Immigrazione e diritti sociali: il nodo irrisolto del riparto di competenze tra Stato e 
regioni”, in La governance dell’immigrazione. Diritti, politiche e competenze, ed. Emanuele Rossi, Francesco 
Biondi Dal Monte, Massimiliano Vrenna (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013), 244-251. 
20 http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/it/accordo-dintegrazione. For a thorough analysis 
of  this document see Francesca Biondi Dal Monte and Massimiliano Vrenna, “L’accordo di 
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place through the attendance of  training courses, covering topics such as the Italian 
language, the Constitution, the educational system, and healthcare, etc., as well as 
expressed adhesion to the Charter of  Values of  Citizenship and Integration.21 The 
latter, in particular, is a document summarizing and explaining the fundamental 
principles and values of  Italian law which regulate the collective life of  citizens and 
non-citizens, which the regular immigrant is essentially obliged to join.
In this context, it is important to emphasize that the foreigner is required not 
simply to know and respect (which would evidently be shareable) the national culture 
and values, but rather to embrace them. This is the expression of  an assimilative 
rather than integrative logic, intended to “void” diversity rather than to limit it.22 
To this end, are of  great interest the studies carried out on the assimilation 
policies adopted in Japan towards the end of  the 1800s with regard to the Ainu 
minority, which included, inter alia, the encouragement of  mixed marriages and the 
obligation to cultivate land, with the related prohibition of  living according to the 
traditional nomadism models this has led to the almost complete extinction of  the 
Ainu population over the years.23
However, the theoretical reference of  the Integration Agreement and the 
related adhesion to the Charter of  Values could, prima facie, be found in Habermas’ 
quoted thesis on constitutional patriotism. But, actually, the immigrant does not 
decide to embrace the values of  the said Charter as recognition of  the universal goal 
of  “common constitution”; he/she is instead forced to sign a contract of  adhesion – 
not merely concerning synallagmatic performances, but rather its own value system 
– without having the opportunity of  negotiate on its content.
Some excerpts of  the Charter of  Values are particularly significant where, for 
example, it is stated that the immigrant is required to “…share the principles regulating the 
Italian society...” or that “…living in the same territory means to be full-fledged citizens of  that 
land and acquire, with loyalty and coherence, common values and share responsibilities...”, until 
even demanding that “…no one can say to be offended by the signs and symbols of  a religion 
different from his/her own…”. It clearly outlines a serious confusion between law and 
morality, between rules to be respected and improper invasion of  the intimate feeling 
of  each individual.24
The rationale underlying this approach lies in a twofold order of  consideration. 
Firstly – recalling the thesis of  Mill’s “cultural monism” – the failure to recognize the 
identities and cultures of  different ethnic groups is justified on stability and security 
requirements, which are presumed to be more guaranteed by unity rather than by 
pluralism.25 In other words, it is looming a peculiar application of  the theory of  
integrazione ovvero l’integrazione per legge. I riflessi sulle politiche regionali e locali”, in La 
governance dell’immigrazione. Diritti, politiche e competenze, ed. Emanuele Rossi, Francesco Biondi Dal 
Monte, Massimiliano Vrenna (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013), 253. 
21 http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/it/documentazione/circolari/carta-dei-valori-della-cittadinanza-e-
dellintegrazione. 
22 Enrico Gargiulo, Integrazione o esclusione? I meccanismi di selezione dei non cittadini tra livello statale e livello 
locale, Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza (2014): 41. 
23 Noémi Godefroy, “The Ainu assimilation policies during the Meiji period and the acculturation of  Hokkaidô’s 
indigenous people”, http://www.popjap.fr/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Godefroy_Ainu_assimilation_policies.
pdf. 
24 Steven Shavell, “Law versus Morality as Regulators of  Conduct”,  American Law Economic Review 4 
(2002): 227 
25 Katherine Smits, “John Stuart Mill And The Social Construction Of  Identity”, History of  Political 
Thought 25 (2004): 298. 
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utilitarianism theorized by Bentham, according to which the choices of  the governors 
should not be dictated by moral reasons but aimed at achieving the maximum benefit 
for the majority of  the associates.26 It, thus, raises the real nature of  the Integration 
Agreement which – although sold as an integration tool – is rather a selection tool, 
aimed at reducing the (potentially) adverse effects on Italian citizens, allowing the 
permanence in the national territory only for immigrants willing to renounce (at least 
‘in public’) their identity to embrace in full a new culture and new values.27
From another point of  view, restrictive positions in terms of  recognition of  
identity rights to the immigrant population are based on the idea of  the ‘inessentiality’ 
of  the differences. Since the Declaration of  the Rights of  Man and of  the Citizen 
of  1789,28 the model of  the modern democratic State is based on the conviction that 
what unites us is more relevant than what divides us. It had, among other things, 
the consequence of  weakening the attention to the protection of  the differences (in 
race, gender, religion, etc.) in the name of  a ‘forced’ interpretation of  the principle of  
formal equality.29 It is not a coincidence if  one of  the greatest exponents of  modern 
liberal thought, John Stuart Mill, considered the request of  safeguarding cultural 
identities by minorities as an obstacle to the development of  a fair and solid society. 
He rather indicated the path of  the absorption of  ethnic groups within the national 
culture, defined as beneficial if  in favor of  a more advanced nationality.30
IV. The multicultural approach and the recognition of  identity 
rights
From what has previously been stated, it is clear how, both, the exclusionary and 
the assimilative approach show many critical issues. In fact, on the one hand, they do 
not seem to be able to guarantee the implementation of  a safe and peaceful social 
model and, on the other hand, although they are based on antithetical grounds, they 
both end up not recognizing the immigrant’s identity rights: one, due to the defense of  
national cultural identity, the other, because of  supposed needs for democratic equality 
and public safety. 
Such “unitary” social models contrast the idea based on multiculturalism, namely 
on recognition and, where necessary, protection of  cultural diversity.31 The underlying 
26 Jeremy Bentham, Introduzione ai principi della morale e della legislazione (Torino: Utet, 1998). 
27 For an overview of  EU policies on integration clauses concerning regular migration see Stefano 
Montaldo, “Integration examinations for regular migrants: the difficult search for a balance between national 
competencies and full effectiveness of  EU law”, EU Law Journal 2 (2016): 39. 
28 See Keith Baker, “The Idea of  a Declaration of  Rights”, in The French Idea of  Freedom: The Old 
Regime and the Declaration of  Rights of  1789, ed. Dale Van Kley, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1997), 154; Immanuel Wallerstein, “Citizens All? Citizens Some! The Making of  the Citizen”, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 45, (2003): 650. 
29 For a critique of  this position see Axel Honneth, La lotta per il riconoscimento, (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 
2002). 
30 «Experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another: 
and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of  the human race the absorption 
is greatly to its advantage», John S. Mill, Representative government (Kitchener: Batoche, 2001), 185.
31 For a general overview on multiculturalism model of  society see Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism 
and «The Politics of  Recognition» (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Bhikhu Parekh, 
Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (London: Palgrave, 2005); Gaetano 
Azzariti, “Multiculturalismo e Costituzione”, Politica del diritto 1-2 (2016): 3; Carlo Di Marco, “Il 
multiculturalismo alla prova della democrazia occidentale. I diritti degli stranieri nei territori di accoglienza”, 
Democrazia e diritto 1-2 (2012): 383. 
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danger to this approach is obviously to legitimise attitudes of  identity closure. Refusing 
to adapt to the new social and political reality in which we are involved it would lead 
to the formation of  a fragmented community of  non-dialogic ethnic monads, i.e. the 
plural monoculturalism.32 Nevertheless, it has been effectively noted in this regard that 
“…national minorities do not want isolation but an integration that is respectful of  the distinctive 
character of  their group…”,33 in a perspective, therefore, of  mutual recognition of  enriching 
but non-exclusionary diversities. Our society is intended to be increasingly pluralistic, 
whether it is desired or not: the challenge is not to cancel or even exalt individual 
identities, but to avoid creating fragile convictions founded on opposing ethnic groups 
and stemming stances that are unavailable to dialogue, enhancing the essential contents 
of  a common feeling.34
Firstly, this presupposes a reconsideration of  the idea of  identity, i.e. more 
flexible and dynamic or, better, ‘permeable’. In the wake of  Habermas’ argumentative 
democracy theory, both the host and the one who is received must act in an attitude of  
mutual listening and understanding, not aimed at the incorporation of  the weaker in 
the stronger (or more numerous),35 but rather, at the identification of  common areas 
of  dialogue that can lead to the best integration possible of  two new identities (since 
both have come in touch with the “other”).36
In order for this to happen, it is obviously necessary that the debate and the 
research of  the sharing elements both take place on a totally laical basis, not characterized 
by untouchable fields of  truth (i.e. religious or ethical). The latter – whose existence 
cannot be denied since they are part of  the system of  values of  any community – must, 
however, necessarily remain out of  the public integration policies, and must be managed 
at a different and higher relational level, based on the recognition of  fundamental 
rights and the principle of  tolerance. So, it is essential that this approach – hard but 
not utopian – be the bedrock of  public policies, especially local ones, as it is perhaps 
the only one able to guarantee a peaceful development of  the new pluralistic societies. 
In Italy, this approach finds hesitant attempts of  concretisation in some regional 
regulations on immigrants’ integration, as concrete measures of  cultural and social 
inclusion are provided for. With the launch of  Italian language courses for migrant 
students and workers and the organization of  intercultural education’s projects in 
schools and universities, aimed at preserving the cultural values and identities of  
immigrant populations; the provision of  cultural mediation in hospitals, schools and 
public offices in Italy is getting better.37
32 See Amartya K. Sen, Identità e violenza (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2008). 
33 Patrick Savidan, Il multiculturalismo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010), 71. 
34 In this sense, we should refer to the “reflective equilibrium” theorized by John Rawls, A Theory of  
Justice, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 65, according to which if  judgments of  
two or more people conflict in some way, it is possible to proceed by adjusting their various beliefs 
until they are in “equilibrium” stable. 
35 «La strada dell’eguaglianza è una strada dialogica, in cui le identità individuali e collettive si 
formano e si trasformano continuamente attraverso il riconoscimento dell’altro che da immigrato 
(o comunque non cittadino) diventa persona eguale alle altre persone, con gli stessi diritti e gli stessi 
doveri» Paolo Carrozza, “Noi e gli altri. Per una cittadinanza fondata sulla residenza e sull’adesione 
ai doveri costituzionali”, in La governance dell’immigrazione. Diritti, politiche e competenze, ed. Emanuele 
Rossi, Francesco Biondi Dal Monte, Massimiliano Vrenna (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013), 59. 
36 Jürgen Habermas, L’inclusione dell’altro (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2013), 151. See also Pier Luigi 
Zanchetta, “Lo Stato-Nazione tra multiculturalismo e globalizzazione. Analisi e proposte di Jurgen Habermas” 
Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza 1 (2000): 14.
37 See, for instance, l.r. Campania, 8 February 2010, n. 6; l.r. Toscana, 9 June 2009, n. 29; l.r. Marche, 
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V. Public integration policies and resilient societies
In this context, the dynamics of  resilient communities’ behaviors comes to the aid 
as a constituent element of  effective integration policies. In relation to the phenomenon 
of  immigration, it is possible to identify at least two areas of  resilience. By observing 
the community that hosts the immigrant, it arises as it tends to assume an attitude 
aimed to face the difficulties threatening its physical and social environment. This can 
lead – although not entirely consciously – to an exaltation of  the sense of  community 
and to an attitude of  hostility towards the cause of  breakup of  the former state of  
(ostensible) equilibrium.38 Conversely, several studies show that a resilient community 
is also a dynamic community, ready to change and find a new balance in relation to 
pressures coming from outside.39 It is, precisely, the development of  such an attitude 
that should be fostered by public integration policies. 
In a different light, it should be noted that the justifiable resilient attitude of  
immigrant communities (who share difficulties in entering and staying in a new country), 
as it is likely to degenerate, if  not adequately channeled, into self-marginalisation, 
closing dialogue, and radicalisation of  diversity.40 Keeping their traditions alive, creating 
moments of  community sharing and fighting for the right to profess their faith, are all 
phenomena perfectly consistent with the attitude of  a “constructive resistance”, by which 
man avoids succumbing to the enormous difficulties deriving from immigration (often 
not voluntary, but imposed by need). Only if  such phenomena are fostered by public 
policies aimed at a genuine integration within the new community, it is possible to 
imagine the development of  a sustainable pluralist society.
In this sense, inter alia, a differentiated analysis of  the resilience behaviors of  each 
immigrant communities would be desirable. The foreigner stress factors are, essentially, 
universal: language difficulties, a sense of  marginalization, and self-determination 
incapability; cultural misunderstanding are all common examples. However, the 
reactions to these stressors are not always the same. Several studies demonstrate 
significant differences between ethnic groups concerning risk exposure and dealing 
with difficulties.41 Therefore, public integration policies – and not merely assimilation 
policies – should also take into account this factor and should be structured flexibly 
and be adaptable to the resilience of  different models that characterize the main ethnic 
groups.
VI. Concluding remarks
In conclusion, the said integrative approach seems to find its basis in the 
26 May 2009, n. 13; l.r. Liguria, 20 February 2007, n. 7; l.r. Puglia, 4 December 2009, n. 32; l.r. Lazio, 
14 July 2008, n. 10; l.r. Abruzzo, 13 December 2004, n. 46. 
38 Caroline S. Clauss-Ehlers and Liliana Lopez Levi, “Violence and Community, Terms in Conflict: An 
Ecological Approach to Resilience”, Journal of  Social Distress and the Homeless 11 (2002): 265. 
39 Charles S. Carver, “Resilience and thriving: issues models and linkages”, Journal of  Social Issues 2 (1998): 
245.
40 Nyla R. Branscombe and Naomi Ellemers, “Coping with group-based discrimination: Individualistic versus 
group-levelStrategies”, in Prejudice: The target’s perspective, ed. Jaten K. Swim, Charles Stangor (San Diego: 
Academic Press, 1998); Monica Pellerone and Alessia Maria Gervasi, “Il percorso d’integrazione”, 
in Percorsi migratori e cambiamenti identitari nella sfida all’integrazione, ed. Monica Pellerone and Valeria 
Schimmenti (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2014), 97. 
41 Anna Zlobina et al. “Sociocultural adjustment of  immigrants: Universal and group-specific predictors”, 
International Journal of  Intercultural Relations 2 (2006): 195 
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categories of  bio-politics – as listed by Foucault – where it identifies the main object 
of  politics in the protection of  human life as a value in itself.42 Of  course, there is a 
strong risk that life-enhancing goals in the bio-political framework may be reflected in 
the protection of  health and identity of  their own citizens by their own governments, 
with the inevitable consequence of  closure towards the exterior and of  legitimising 
foreclosure in the name of  public safety. By contrast, the bio-politics – as ars governandi 
– must be considered as a model of  political confrontation and cultural development, 
aimed at ensuring the good of  the community by means of  constant democratic 
effort to reconcile the need for universality with the ethical and cultural pluralism of  
current multiethnic societies. The challenge of  multiculturalism, after all, is precisely to 
recognize the value of  “diversity”, while ensuring social cohesion.43 
In a different perspective, the study of  the migratory phenomenon also refers 
to bio-politics theory as theorized by Hardt and Negri, understood as the natural 
tendency of  postmodern society to meet its own needs, resisting the legal and economic 
institutions that aim to control and regulate it in all its (economic and social) activities.44 
An effective public policy of  integration, should also adopt instruments to overcome 
the stress factor consisting in the incapability of  the immigrant to actively participate in 
the social life of  the new community in which he/she lives.45
In this regard, the experience of  some local areas should be noted, as it is 
provided that the public authorities prefer to use the immigrants for cultural mediation 
activities,46 obviously only if  suitably qualified. Or, moreover, the so-called Board for 
Integration (whose functions are, essentially, advisory and propositional), present in 
many regions, which include, as members (and not only as recipients), representatives 
of  the immigrant communities.47
In conclusion, the proposed public policy model, inspired by the concrete 
respect for cultural diversity and by the promotion of  mutual and participatory 
integration, seems not to be a mere option for the national and regional legislators, but 
rather, a constitutional duty. Such is, first of  all, due to a non-improperly egalitarian 
interpretation of  Art. 3 of  the Italian Constitution: the only inequalities to be tackled 
are the discriminatory ones; by imposing a forced and transversal equality, this ends 
up being discriminatory in itself  and contrary to the principle of  substantial equity.48
42 Michel Foucault, Nascita della biopolitica, (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2004). See also Jacopo Martire, “The 
Rule of  Law: A Foucauldian Interpretation, In-Spire Journal of  Law, Politics and Societies 6 (2011): 19. 
43 «Democracies are in a standing dilemma. They need strong cohesion around a political identity, 
and precisely this provides a strong temptation to exclude those who can’t or won’t fit easily into 
the identity which the majority feels comfortable with, or believes alone can hold them together. 
And yet exclusion, besides being profoundly morally objectionable, also goes against the legitimacy 
idea of  popular sovereignty, which is to realize the government of  all the people» Charles Taylor, 
Dilemmas and Connection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 138. 
44 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Impero. Il nuovo ordine della globalizzazione (Milano: Rizzoli, 2002). 
45 Elisa Olivito, “Primi spunti di riflessione su multiculturalismo e identità culturali nella prospettiva della 
vulnerabilità” Politica del diritto 1 (2007): 98-101. 
46 See, for instance, l.r. Abruzzo, 13 December 2004, n. 46. For a thorough analysis of  this 
fundamental moment of  the integration policy see Chiara Bergonzini, La mediazione culturale: uno 
strumento (sottovalutato?) per l’integrazione degli immigrati, Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza (2009): 67. 
47 See l.r. Campania, 8 February 2010, n. 6; l.r. Marche, 26 May 2009, n. 13; l.r. Puglia, 4 December 
2009, n. 32; l.r. Lazio, 14 July 2008, n. 10. For a critical comment on the Board of  integration model 
of  intervention see Marta Ferrara, “I diritti di partecipazione dell’immigrato: il Consiglio provinciale 
dell’immigrazione”, in I diritti degli altri. Gli stranieri e le autorità di governo, ed. Enzo Di Salvatore, 
Michela Michetti (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2014), 269. 
48 The foundation of  multiculturalism is to consider true equality just that which doesn’t hide 
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The constitutional constraint also derives from paragraph 4 of  Art. 118 of  the 
Italian Constitution. The enhancement of  the principle of  horizontal subsidiarity, 
also regarding the management of  the migratory phenomenon,49 would, in fact, have 
a twofold advantage: firstly,  it would help the (regular) immigrant to feel ‘part’ of  the 
community, rather than an extraneous burden, thus achieving also the constitutional 
purpose of  the full development of  each person. An active social attitude by regular 
immigrants would then facilitate the local authorities themselves in developing more 
mindful and, therefore, more effective integration policies.
(non-discriminatory) differences, but allows a peaceful coexistence. From a different point of  
view, a blind egalitarianism would also collides with the s.c. positive discrimination, which allows 
distinguished policies aimed at making sure that people such as women, members of  smaller racial 
groups, and people with disabilities get a fair share of  the opportunities available, see Michael 
Sandel, Giustizia. Il nostro bene commune (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2009), 188. See also Council Directive 
2000/43/EC of  29 June 2000, on “Implementing the principle of  equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of  racial or ethnic origin”, art. 5 “With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the 
principle of  equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting 
specific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin”. 
49 Gregorio Arena, “Immigrazione e cittadinanze”, in Poteri pubblici e laicità delle istituzioni, ed. 
Riccardo Acciai, Fabio Giglioni (Roma: Aracne, 2008), 113. 
